China's Arms Sales: Motivations And Implications

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

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Roger Cliff, Daniel Byman : China's Arms Sales: Motivations And Implications before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised China's Arms Sales: Motivations And Implications:

China's arms sales have become the focus of considerable attention and pose a moderate threat to U.S. interests. Although Chinese sales have fallen in recent years, and Beijing has become more responsible in the transfer of

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) technologies, much progress will be needed to curtail China's behavior. Principal recipients of Chinese arms have been Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, and Thailand. These countries and others seek Chinese weapons because they are available, cheap, and easy to use and maintain. In addition to missiles, the Chinese are willing to transfer NBC technology. The United States and other countries do have a modest ability to influence Chinese behavior, and China has increasingly wished to be viewed as a responsible world nation. The analysis supports three major findings about China's arms sale behavior: (1) China's arms transfers not motivated primarily to generate export earnings but by

From the PublisherChina's arms transfers have become the focus of considerable attention.In the 1980s, China emerged as a major supplier of conventionalweapons to the developing world. More recently, China'stransfers of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons technology, aswell as equipment and materials that could be used in the manufactureof chemical and biological weapons, have seized world attention,particularly in the United States. This study documents China'sprincipal arms-transfer relationships, analyzes the motivations ofsupplier and recipients, evaluates which arms transfers are of greatestconcern, and identifies possible constraints on China's armssales. It then assesses the threat posed by the transfers.This study is part of a larger, multiyear project on "Chinese DefenseModernization and Its Implications for the U.S. Air Force." Other reportsfrom this project include:Mark Burles, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central AsianRepublics, MR-1045-AF, 1999.Zalmay Khalilzad, Abram Shulsky, Daniel Byman, Roger Cliff,David Orletsky, David Shlapak, and Ashley Tellis, The UnitedStates and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications,MR-1082-AF, 1999.This project is conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program ofProject AIR FORCE under the sponsorship of the Deputy Chief ofStaff for Air and Space Operations, U.S. Air Force (AF/XO).Comments are welcome and may be directed either to the authors orthe project leader, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad. PROJECT AIR FORCEProject AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force federallyfunded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies andanalysis. It provides the Air Force with independent analysis of policyalternatives affecting the development, employment, combatreadiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces.Research is performed in four programs: Aerospace Force Development;Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Research Management;and Strategy and Doctrine.About the AuthorDaniel L. Byman (Ph.D., political science, M.I.T.) is a policy analyst at Rand whose research interests include modeling ethnic conflict, assessing Middle East politics and security issues, developing countermeasures against terrorism, reevaluating air power theory, and other general issues related to U.S. foreign policy. Roger Cliff (Ph.D., International Relations, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University) is an Associate Political Scientist, Rand, Washington DC. Areas of research include U.S. policy toward China, Chinese arms transfers, technological progress in China, and Chinese military technology.